28.4.07

Security for Economic Growth: Ethnic Conflict and the U.S. in Southern Philippines

Security for Economic Growth: Ethnic Conflict and
the U.S. in Southern Philippines

By Datu Ishak Mastura, Esq.
*

Abstract

In the wake of 9/11, the U.S. military forces went back to southern Philippines ostensibly to engage in counterterrorism training exercises against the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) linked Abu Sayyaf. The focus of the U.S. mission was to help the Philippine forces to hunt down JI and Abu Sayyaf. It has been theorized that the U.S. mission in southern Philippines was the test ground of the Pentagon’s wider mission in Southeast Asia which is to integrate “gap or seam” states into the functioning core of globalization beginning with the areas of localized state failure in Mindanao, where there is an existing long-running insurgency by the Muslim Moro ethnic group. At first, they were successful in rooting out Abu Sayyaf in Basilan Island by orchestrating a humanitarian assistance campaign, which severed the link between the terrorists and the rest of the Muslim population. However, the same mission has bogged down in the Sulu Island because of failure of political planning and to take into consideration the political economy of security, which in this case means dealing with the Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation) struggle for self-determination.

The essential lesson after five years of U.S. counterterrorism policy is that in order for local Muslim populations to take the counterterrorism agenda of the U.S. seriously, it must take their state-building and power-sharing agendas seriously too since conflict resolution and good governance are in fact the key to countering terrorism in the long term beginning with assistance to the Mindanao peace process with the Moro rebels. U.S. efforts in Mindanao must be complemented with nation or state (re)building of a Bangsa Moro homeland that has its roots in formerly independent Moro sultanates in order to anchor stability in the East Maritime Southeast Asia astride crucial sea-lines of communication. Japan and USAID are assisting in the reconstruction and development of the Bangsa Moro areas in Mindanao but without the necessary state or institution (re) building of a Bangsa Moro homeland within the Philippine state there is the risk of Mindanao reverting to the status quo because of the inherent weakness of the Philippines. Failure to contain or eliminate terrorism in Mindanao might herald Great Power war in the region since according to the theory of International Terrorism and the World System, the outbreak of terrorist activities signals hegemonic succession (possibly from the U.S. to China, which is increasing its influence in the Philippines within the traditional sphere of influence of the U.S.), and the trigger for Great Power war as what happened in the Thirty Years War and the WW I is usually a terrorist event.

U.S. mission in Mindanao

It has been postulated before that the mission of the U.S. in Southern Philippines is bringing the lawless parts or areas of localized state failure in Mindanao, principally populated by the Muslim Moro ethnic group or Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation), within the “limits of Western civilization” in the archaic terminology of Ralston Hayden
[1], which is translated today as bringing “security into the gap or seam” in Mindanao in order to connect Mindanao to the wider benefits of “globalization.”[2]


This mission is not new as it was defined by Ralston Hayden even in 1928 with regard to the Moros of Mindanao, if by “globalization” we mean the Western-dominated system we have today, which is basically Hayden’s thesis regarding the “limits of Western civilization” reformulated for the 21st Century. Coincidentally or not, Thomas Barnett has defined the role of the U.S. military or the Pentagon in his book, The Pentagon’s New Map, as protecting and projecting “globalization”. According to an article by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) based in Singapore, the fundamental thesis of Barnett is that “disconnectedness defines danger.”
[3] To be disconnected is to be disengaged from the globalizing world and all its attendant values, norms and interdependence. On this premise, the U.S. strategy is to fix the disconnectedness in areas like Mindanao in the Southern Philippines so-called “gap or seam” states, which are failed, failing or simply weak. This will entail building effective governance, democratic regimes, and connectedness among disconnected states via economic, military and political means. By exporting security into the gap or seam states, the Pentagon hopes to stem the migration of terrorist activities to the United States, and regional investment, business and trade links can be expanded. Barnett says that, “The integration of the gap will ultimately depend more on private investment than anything the core’s public sector can offer.”[4]


The IDSS article recognizes that this strategy of the Pentagon is being seriously pursued in the region and that it addresses the question of whether the U.S. has an ASEAN strategy or not.
[5]

U.S. counterterrorism training exercises in Mindanao

In the Philippines, the U.S. military through its annual training exercises has focused on containing and reducing an environment open and willing to support terrorist activities and ideology through a consolidation of roles of civil, military and medical units wherein military and civil action had been combined with humanitarian efforts, such as in Basilan in 2002, which reduced sanctuaries for the Abu-Sayyaf group.
[6] According to these types of operations, which were also tried in Afghanistan, the fulcrum of anti-terrorist activities are the civilian population where terrorist elements are supposed to have embedded themselves, to wit:

The center of gravity became the Afghan people. If you can provide reconstruction, provide security, bring benefits to the Afghan national government to those provinces, then what you do is deny that area to the insurgents.
[7]


While the strategy was relatively successful in Basilan, the ostensible mission being to help Filipino troops kill or capture international terrorists, which was accomplished by orchestrating a humanitarian assistance campaign, which severed the link between the terrorists and the rest of the Muslim population allowing the U.S. military forces to leave Basilan, the American achievement in Basilan is already being endangered because of the weak Philippine state and the age-old problem of ethnic conflict between the Moros and the Christian Filipinos.
[8] As Robert Kaplan said in his book Imperial Grunts regarding the U.S. military in Basilan:

Though I would learn more about Operation Enduring Freedom, one thing was already obvious: America could not change the vast forces of history and culture that had placed a poor Muslim region at the southern edge of a badly governed, Christian-run archipelago nation. All America could do was insert its armed forces here and there, as unobtrusively as possible, to alleviate perceived threats to its own security when they became particularly acute…..Humanitarian assistance may not be the weapon of choice for Pentagon hardliners, who prefer to hunt down and kill "bad guys" through direct action rather than dig wells and build schools—projects that in any case are possibly unsustainable, because national governments like that of the Philippines lack the resolve to pick up where the United States leaves off. I had the distinct sense that the work of Special Forces on Basilan had merely raised expectations—ones the government in Manila would be unable to meet.
[9]

Burden of history

Unfortunately for America, it cannot escape responsibility for the troubled history of Mindanao, for it was precisely America, who nearly a century ago as the colonial master of the Philippines, lumped the Moro areas in Mindanao together with the Filipino nation when there was no need to do so after having already won the peace and establishing the Moro Province “allowing for a considerable de facto autonomy for Mindanao and Sulu.”
[10]


Early in the American colonial administration, U.S. imperial nation-building imagined Muslims or the Moros as permanently outside the Philippine nation that U.S. colonialism was constructing and “the Moro Province was in many ways constructed as an independent state under U.S. military authorities.”
[11] The Moro leadership appreciated American colonial control with the hope that Americans sympathetic to the separation of Mindanao from the Philippines would eventually give “independence” promised them after the completion of the “civilizing process.”[12] In the words of Eugene Martin, a retired American diplomat, who became the executive director of the Philippine Facilitation Project of the United States Institute of Peace:

The United States has been involved with Filipino-Muslims since 1898 when we purchased the Philippine Islands from the Spanish for $20 million. Although it never conquered the Islamic sultanates in the south, Spain was willing to transfer all the islands to the United States as if it had. We succeeded in overcoming Moro resistance where Spain failed, thanks to modern weaponry and tactics. Realizing the ethnic and religious differences between the Moros and the rest of the Philippines, the U.S. colonial government administered Muslim areas separately, giving them considerable autonomy in local and cultural affairs. Perhaps as a result of U.S. colonial policies, representatives from Muslim areas formally urged Washington not to include those areas in the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935, preferring even to remain a U.S. colony for a longer period. The United States did not heed Muslim entreaties, which has resulted in Moros occasionally telling Washington that the subsequent problems are the fault of the United States so “we” should fix them.
[13]


Alas, for the Moros a separate future from the Philippines was not to be because of the implementation of the policy of Filipinization by succeeding American administrators of the Philippine colony wherein Moros were administered by Filipinos in their own homeland.

The Bangsa Moro struggle

The current Moro armed conflict is the sharpest expression of this struggle or clash between two imagined nations or nationalisms, Filipino and Moro, with their own narratives of the conflict.
[14] For the Moro revolutionary movements, it has been a conscious struggle to regain the historical sovereignty of the independent Moro nation-states, particularly the Maguindanao and Sulu Sultanates, which according to the historian De La Costa by 1718 had become “full-fledged sultanates with a fiscal administration, courts of justice and a bureaucracy of a rudimentary kind.”[15] For the Philippine government and nation-state of the 20th century, it has been a matter of defending its territorial integrity against secession and dismemberment making the conflict a veritable case of “irresistible forces, immovable objects.”[16]


Understandably, the U.S. government has been loath to be involved in this historical minefield, which had beginnings from its own colonial history in the Philippines almost a century ago. While some note the relative success of joint U.S.-Filipino training exercises against the Abu Sayyaf, others warn that increasing U.S. involvement could “complicate” the Philippine’s insurgency dilemma and also possibly fuel anti-American sentiment in the region which could form the basis “of a new pan-Islamic solidarity in the region.”
[17] Some experts contend that not all militant Muslim groups operating in the region are aligned with Al Qaeda and it is important that U.S. counter-terror efforts in the region “do not motivate these potential affiliates to join the Al Qaeda cause.”[18]

The worse thing that the U.S. military could do is to be lured by the Philippine government to confront militarily in conjunction with the Philippine military the Moro revolutionary groups, be it the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) or its larger splinter faction the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), as the break-up of the Moro revolutionary organizations would likely spawn new Fourth Generation War groups that will be harder to eliminate and contribute to decades of instability in Mindanao and the rest of the region. Paraphrasing Fourth Generation War guru William Lind:

[M]ost of what [the Philippine military is facing]…..today is not yet Fourth Generation warfare, but a War of National Liberation, fought by people whose goal is to restore a [Moro] state. But as that goal fades and those forces splinter, Fourth Generation war will come more and more to the fore. What will characterize it is not vast changes in how the enemy fights, but rather in who fights and what they fight for. The change in who fights makes it difficult for us to tell friend from foe…..The change in what our enemies fight for makes impossible the political compromises that are necessary to ending any war. We find that when it comes to making peace, we have no one to talk to and nothing to talk about. And the end of a war like that in Iraq [or the Philippine insurgency] becomes inevitable: the local state we attacked vanishes, leaving behind either a stateless region (Somalia) or a façade of a state (Afghanistan) within which more non-state elements rise and fight.
[19]


Besides it is not in the interest of U.S. counterterrorism policy to have the MILF (since the MNLF is now confined to Sulu Island) splintered into several groups scattered over a large swath of the big island of Mindanao, making it difficult to track them down and to gather intelligence information on the movement.
[20] Splintering into smaller groups will inevitably lead to lesser command and control of the central leadership and local autonomy for guerrilla commanders, who may be inclined to follow their own strategies such as linking-up with extremists.

Often the Moro revolutionary movements are criticized for being diffused or decentralized making it difficult to have a single group to negotiate for a peace settlement. However, they fail to realize that the Moros are a traditional tribal warrior society. As a traditional clan-based tribal society, the Moros have evolved the most lethal cocktail of warfighting capability that has enabled them to survive the onslaught of modern forces including military force for centuries. Tribes, clans and family groups that are the traditional composition of Moro society take orders from their own leaders, often based in local hierarchies, and do not belong to a centralized military command and control structure unless their commander or traditional leader commits them to it so often local commanders get their men from their own personal following coming from their clans, family ties or their villages.
[21] As a result, the loss or capture of a commander impacts on the effectiveness of an individual unit, but other units in the area are able to continue their operations.[22]

The clan and tribal structure of the Moros does not mean that revolutionary movements like the MILF are incoherent. Rather, the MILF and other Moro revolutionary groups were established through the clan-based and kinship network so that in the beginning were the clans and through their shared history of grievances against the central government was formed the Bangsamoro revolutionary cause. According to field observation by one researcher in 2005, “the MILF is a more unitary organization than it is given credit for (though it is hardly monolithic) with effective (though it can be slow) command and control.”
[23] More recently in 2006 in a Terrorism Conference in Singapore, a consensus was arrived that the MILF leadership remains strong and controls large territory under the grip of hard-line commanders, who nevertheless see that the dividends of peace as attractive.[24]


The lesson for policymakers is that it is the organically evolved complexity of a society such as that of the Moros that sustains and defines its survival (which is the essence of victory itself).
[25] One observation defines the supreme art of survival of the Moros in the face of superior forces pressing from outside, and that is “Individual clans can be simultaneously represented in local politics, local military commands and local insurgency commands. Images of the conflict based on the clash of two clearly defined ‘sides’ fail to grasp this essential reality. Policies that do not take it into account will founder.”[26]

Another lesson for policymakers is that when the military of an outside power such as the U.S. (or the Philippine military in Moro territory for that matter) invades the territory of a traditional society, the strict customary codes that govern the use of force, status of noncombatants, and proportionality of attacks are often modified and even suspended, wherein there are fewer restrictions and anybody becomes fair game,
[27] as what happened in Basilan and Sulu (or the 2000 “all out war” against the MILF) for a time before the Philippine military and U.S. advisers switched to a “hearts and minds” campaign and surgical strikes against Abu Sayyaf.

Nation or State-(Re) building

However, as they become more embedded locally, some analysts say the U.S. troops may have to eventually deal with problems other than security, and foremost of which is the undemocratic and corrupt nature of local political power, on the premise that the ultimate success of the “war on terror” hinges not on the physical elimination of groups like the Abu Sayyaf, but in resolving the absence of democratic politics in Muslim Mindanao by ending the domination of the political clans.
[28] Eliminating clan power in order to have a more democratic government in Muslim Mindanao would require the US military to engage in state (re)building to usher in a new set of leaders more representative of Muslim popular interests.[29] Three obstacles make this unlikely: “First, Manila itself has little interest in or ability to pursue this strategy; second, the very politicians who are now allies in the “war on terror” would fiercely oppose it; and third, this is precisely the kind of political and administrative muddle that most American policy makers shun; nevertheless, it is hard to envision any other path to long-term stability in Muslim Mindanao.”[30]


Reinforcing this view is the comment by one resident foreign observer that:

Discussions of a constructive U.S. role typically focus on promoting security and development, but this approach fails to recognize a simple truth: the traditional prerogatives of power in the southern Philippines are fundamentally incompatible with either. A thin veneer of democratic institutions covers a society that remains essentially feudal, conforming less to democratic ideals than to the style of the datus, the warrior chiefs of old. Leadership is personal and paternalistic and functions largely above the law; power flows from guns and money.
[31]


Political solution to ethnic conflict

U.S. military thinking recognizes that ethnic-based secessionist movements like that of the Moros are spawned by failures in integration and assimilation, wherein as ethnic groups are convinced that they are unable to compete and to be accommodated within undivided states; in effect colonized by administrators from other regions and subject to discriminatory language and hiring policies so that they seek independence or seek to regain their original status of sovereignty.
[32] More often than not they are heedless of the economic costs of separation even if it will likely mean loss of subsidies from the center because their political and ethnic goals outweigh the benefits that come with the undivided state.[33] As we have seen, ethnic conflict stems from deep historical roots. Thus, they ultimately require “political solutions” since the use of military force can never achieve a lasting solution and at best military force can only accomplish temporary containment of violence and contribute to an environment that permits the establishment of political conditions or institutions that lead to a more lasting solution.[34]

With regard to Southern Philippines, a group of security experts, who met in late 2006 in a Security Conference in Singapore to discuss the terrorism, insurgency and secessionist problems in the Southeast Asian region, brought forth three main lessons learnt: “First, a military solution, or at least a solely military solution, was not viable. The group recommended adopting a “carrot and stick” approach instead; second, it emphasized the need for “good governance”, [which they went] further to unpack the commonly used phrase and listed the values of resisting corruption and graft, transparency, rule of law, de-centralisation, provision of social services and the de-marginalisation of groups [and] third, the group acknowledged that the Philippines faced a problem of implementation and needed to build a comprehensive political solution. The main problem cited was a weak state, necessitating legal and constitutional affairs…..With the MILF, the ceasefire was seen to be positively holding up, with the next step being the introduction of further development projects into the political solution.”
[35]


Dilemma of counterterrorism operations in Mindanao

The key problem for the U.S. as it conducts training exercises in Mindanao to flush out Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) remains the same: “How does one separate the terrorist parasite from its unwilling host, without doing fatal violence to the patient?”
[36]

As it is, according to a study published by the U.S. Committee on Refugees in December 1999, the Philippines is the fourth Southeast Asian country with the most internally displaced persons surpassed only by Myanmar, Indonesia and East Timor.
[37] This displacement is concentrated in Mindanao, where sporadic military operations are conducted against Moro communities suspected of hosting foreign terrorists, or as a result of counterinsurgency operations.

Furthermore, there is the complication that the “terrorists are embedded in a volatile Muslim insurgency with which the West has no quarrel.”
[38] The MILF is Southeast Asia's strongest separatist group with 15,000 armed guerillas enjoying popular support as it expresses the legitimate grievances of the Moros, and is engaged in peace talks with the Philippine government. So what is to be done? Security analysts say that:

American forces are probing the sanctuaries in the guise of training exercises, and they are backing targeted air strikes. But they must tread lightly, lest they be drawn into a shooting war, which would catalyze new alliances among local and foreign militants. A conventional military approach failed in Cambodia and Lebanon. It would fail in Mindanao, too. Instead, surgical military strikes based on an expanded intelligence effort should complement the peace process, prying extremists away from the MILF mainstream. A crucial, if embryonic, mechanism in this campaign is the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, established by the Philippine government and MILF negotiators to facilitate cooperation against "lawless elements" in MILF territory. The Group's mandate should be widened, and resources should be provided to allow it to tackle terrorism explicitly.
[39]


While “surgical strikes” are supposed to be the order of the day, the current operations in Sulu Island where the Abu Sayyaf and their JI mentors are believed to be holed up have not been viewed as an unqualified success as the previous operations against the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan Island even though the some of the top leadership of the Abu Sayyaf including their titular head Khadaffy Janjalani have been killed. So that:

After more than eight months of fighting involving 10,000 troops backed by US combat advisors the Philippine military claims to have killed just 70 Abu Sayyaf militants and two top leaders out of an estimated force of 400. Yet in the process a ten-year old peace agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front has come under strain and dozens, if not hundreds of civilians have died in the crossfire and thousands displaced.
[40]

It is now obvious after the last five years of U.S. counterterrorism policy that in order for local Muslim populations to take the counterterrorism agenda of the United States seriously, it must take their state-building and power-sharing agendas seriously too since conflict resolution and good governance are in fact the key to countering terrorism in the long term.
[41] By relying on sporadic military strikes and continued support for hard line policies of hawkish military elements without broader political planning, it runs the risk of combining the worst elements of its current strategy in Iraq with the Cold War-era policy of cronyism for the strong.[42]

Mindanao peace process as sine qua non for stability in the region

Mindanao has been identified as an international “black hole”
[43] where effective government is weak and as such, “there is also a high level of criminal gang violence and violence connected with illegal operations such as safeguarding illegal logging against popular protest.”[44] Given the predominance of the clans in the social and political order, “armed conflicts between guerrillas and state security bodies often appear to result from private vendettas between rival families, [but] for opportunistic reasons, they are reinterpreted as conflicts within the framework of the political struggle for self-determination.”[45] Typical in the Bangsa Moro areas is the situation in Sulu, to wit:

The situation in Sulu, where strongmen have gained impunity, illustrates how a national government, with all its resources, personnel and legitimacy can be paralyzed and unable to enforce its will. While technically superior, the national government cannot move because it might unsettle the fragile peace in the province. The rule of law breaks down because violence, in the complex milieu of Sulu, becomes its own legitimacy.
[46]


Because the long-running insurgency in Mindanao has created conditions for lawless violence and fostered instability (resulting from clan feuding, ‘strongmen’ politics and military pacification), “the region [is] awash with unregulated firearms that constitutes a threat to security in their own right. The region is now one of the most heavily armed areas in Southeast Asia, and is certainly one of its least secure.”
[47] The Philippine military estimates that in Sulu “there are more than 30,000 loose firearms. Some reports say there are 100,000 loose firearms in the whole of Mindanao.”[48]

Adding to the overall insecurity in Mindanao is the extremely strong gun culture among the Moros, where even poor people have guns. The Moro attitude that owning a gun is the only real means to protect oneself and one’s family and way of life is rooted in the narrative of resistance to colonizers, but now it is being justified by the general insecurity.

Ultimately, it is international support to the peace process with the MILF that will reduce the problem of terrorism and instability in the Philippines that threatens to affect the region. The International Crisis Group states that “genuine and fully implemented autonomy for Philippine Muslims is a sine qua non for winning the long-term war on terror in Mindanao.”
[49]

Of the three tracks (i.e. MNLF, MILF and Abu Sayyaf) constituting the current form of evolution of the Moro conflict, the MILF track seems to be a linchpin of the broader Mindanao peace process and the legitimate fight in defense against terrorism because this track is still evolving.
[50] The MNLF can be expected not to begrudge additional gains for Bangsamoro aspirations (such as those not adequately addressed by the 1996 Peace Agreement), which the MILF might achieve in its negotiations with the Philippine government while at the same time, the Philippine government should realize that the MILF did not split from the MNLF and continue to wage its own struggle, only to end up with a mere enhancement of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) so any offer from the Philippine government has to be qualitatively and substantially better.[51]

Giving priority to the MILF track has been called a bold step that must be taken for “peace in our time” because what is really at stake here is whether the Mindanao conflict can be ended in this generation, or whether it will be passed on to the next one and evolve into a new form with wider implications for stability in the region.
[52]


The American government has expressed support to the peace process with the MILF and no less than the State Department has acknowledged that Moros have “serious legitimate, grievances that must be addressed.”
[53] U.S. policy on the matter is that it “wishes to see an end to the violence in the southern Philippines and is working to assist the Republic of the Philippines in addressing the root causes of that violence.”[54]

Accordingly, “the United States stands ready to support, both politically and financially, a bona fide peace process between the Republic of the Philippines and the MILF.”
[55] The U.S. assisted the peace talk through USIP as a third party observer fostering dialogue between stakeholders in the peace process. Lately, it has signified that the State Department will begin dealing directly with the MILF through a liaison officer.[56]

However, the U.S. has expressed concern about links between the MILF and international terrorist organizations and asked that those links be severed.
[57] In response, shortly before his death in July 2003, MILF chairman, Hashim Salamat, wrote a personal letter to President George Bush denying that the MILF engaged in terroristic acts and disavowing terrorism as a means of attaining its legitimate political ends.[58]

The latest pronouncement of the MILF last December 10, 2006 is that they welcome President Bush’s recent statement “the United States is committed to fostering a climate of peace in Mindanao, and stand ready to provide quick-disbursing assistance once an agreement is signed with the MILF.”
[59] Earlier in 2004, the U.S. earmarked US$30 million for the peace process conditioned on the signing of a peace agreement.

Although the peace talks are currently at an impasse as to the territorial extent of the Bangsamoro homeland and due to the MILF’s insistence that new territories to be added to the existing territory of ARMM should not be incorporated through a plebiscite and thus risk failure just like in the past peace agreements because of the “veto” votes of the Christian settlers, the peace process with the MILF is viewed as irreversible and that it will eventually result in a peace agreement.
[60] The MILF considers 2007 as “make or break for the government and MILF” regarding the conclusion of peace talks.[61]


Failure of the MNLF track as destabilizing factor

On the other hand with regard to the MNLF, the Philippine military has often “felt that the MNLF was a spent force and that the government has won the ‘psy-ops’ war against them, having gotten them to sign a peace agreement, which is being complied with slowly at a pace that the government dictates. Moreover, the government has effectively splintered the ranks of the MNLF, utilizing instruments of patronage.”
[62]

Except for a few pocket guerilla camps in Sulu, who remain loyal to Misuari, the MNLF can no longer field a credible force against the government in the rest of Mindanao especially since “with MNLF integration of up to 5,750 fighters into the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and up to 1,500 fighters into the Philippine National Police (PNP), for a total of 7,250 integrees, at least half of whatever force strength it had, one can say that the MNLF has substantially been defanged.”
[63]


Besides, the MNLF has already lost its hold on the ARMM when it failed to field a candidate for Regional Governor in the last elections on August 8, 2005 and thus, “because of its inadequate record of governance, the MNLF is on the verge of being regarded as irrelevant in the pursuit of peace and development in the region. After almost a decade of leading the ARMM, the fact that its leaders cannot win elections in the region without presidential backing indicates the group’s lackluster track record.”
[64] It has been said that “the tragedy is that the demise of the MNLF may also serve as a death knell for the 1996 peace agreement.”[65]

However, the MNLF presence in Sulu cannot be discounted with regard to its capability to continue to cause disruption in its home turf, which may extend to the other islands in the Sulu Archipelago and the surrounding seas, threatening any future offshore oilfields.
[66]

In fact, in February and November of 2005 fierce fighting raged in Sulu between the Philippine military and the MNLF, who said that their camps were invaded by the military and that they were only retaliating for the military’s atrocities against civilians in the AFP’s pursuit of the criminal and terrorist gang, Abu Sayyaf.
[67]

Nevertheless, even if the MNLF has become a shadow of its former self, other revolutionary groups have been fighting for the Bangsa Moro cause. Indeed, just as then President Fidel Ramos finished concluding a peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996, he turned his attention to another insurgent group, the MILF, with which his government started negotiating in October 1996 and this led in turn to a general ceasefire in July 1997. This peace negotiation represents a second track of the overall Mindanao peace process, the MILF Track, while the MNLF peace agreement with its continuing problems of implementation is labeled as the MNLF Track as earlier stated.
[68]


Transforming the MILF and Muslim Mindanao

Hence, the overall Mindanao peace process finds its convergence in the peace negotiations with the MILF to which international actors have committed their support, such as the participation of Japan, Sweden and Canada to the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team that monitors the ceasefire between the government and the MILF. More innovatively, some experts have suggested that the pivotal international support to the peace process is in helping the transformation of the MILF, to wit:

Transforming the MILF

An important contribution foreign support can provide is also delicate — helping the MILF transform itself into an effective unarmed political force. If this transformation fails there will be no peace. The Moro National Liberation Front has never succeeded in turning itself into an effective regional political party with a permanent voice in national politics. This means that it has always been in a weak position in its dealings with the government and the national ruling party coalition. This lack of a political voice weakened Misuari’s authority and created strong incentives for local commanders to return to the gun to reassert their political interests ‘outside the system’. The latest elections in the ARMM where the president backed a non-MNLF slate clearly shows the shortcomings of this lack of transformation. The MILF needs to succeed where its predecessor organisation failed to ensure the sustainability of any peace deal…..Yet this transition is the lynchpin to a political solution to the Moro insurgency and to severing the links between the Moro insurgency and regional terrorism. Foreign support for the development of the MILF as an independent, mass-based political party with a national voice should only be considered after the MILF central command, through the Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, has shown its ability to sever links between MILF local commanders and regional terrorist groups and to bring the large majority of these commanders over to support a peace deal.
[69]


The proposal for the MILF to transform into a mass-based political party would fit in with the earlier mentioned proposal to eliminate clan power in Muslim Mindanao in order to have a more democratic government in Muslim Mindanao, which would require the US military to engage in state (re)building to usher in a new set of leaders more representative of Muslim popular interests.
[70] The MILF could provide the new set of leaders that is more representative of the Moro masses since it is now their vanguard after the disintegration of the MNLF. After all, according to one academic writer:

Whatever the historical limitations of the MNLF (or the MILF for that matter), given the incontrovertible evidence of their mass following – larger so far than what the CPP/NPA could amass at any given encounter with the AFP – and given the class structure of the Moro people (the majority of whom are exploited peasants and workers) vis-à-vis the majority of Christian Filipinos, there is no question that they genuinely represent the historic grievances and aspirations of their community. To be sure, large-scale political mobilization of Moro combatants with their civilian base may be viewed as participatory democracy in action, grassroots democracy in actual practice.
[71]

U.S. response to Southeast Asian security challenge

More fundamentally for U.S. policy in Southeast Asia helping resolve the legitimate grievances of the Bangsa Moro will advance the elements of Grand Strategy outlined by Professor Marvin C. Ott in his recent article for the Institute of National Strategic Studies of the National Defense University within the U.S. Department of Defense, Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?, wherein its essence is the need for a comprehensive U.S. security strategy for Southeast Asia that addresses the pervasive sense of Muslim grievance, which jihadists have exploited, and that takes seriously the Chinese strategic challenge in the region.
[72]

Ott’s idea is consistent with Barnett’s proposition of integrating areas in the so-called “gap or seam” states to the U.S. led globalized political-economy, which areas in Southeast Asia are mostly Muslim-populated and where societal dislocation and economic hardship among Southeast Asian Muslims (particularly as both generate large numbers of underemployed and poorly educated young men, who are ambitious, energetic, Islamic and frustrated) contribute to terrorism.
[73]

“If America is able to help address the underlying historical grievances of the Muslim people of the southern Philippines, it would be another indication that we are willing to go to bat for people who have legitimate grievances,” according to Eugene Martin, executive director of the Philippine Facilitation Project of the U.S. Institute of Peace.
[74]

At the very least the U.S. role should continue in helping suppress the Abu Sayyaf while encouraging the conclusion of the peace negotiations with the MILF and boosting the political will of the Manila government to institute the necessary reforms for lasting peace.
[75]

If a peace agreement is signed, the U.S. will be confronted with a policy decision whether or not to employ pressure on the Philippine government to faithfully implement its obligations under a peace agreement, which scenario is plausible considering the poor track record at implementation of the Philippine government with the earlier 1977 and 1996 peace agreements with the MNLF.
[76]


Comprehensive approach to security

However, despite the rhetoric scant attention is being paid to the political-economy factor in case a peace deal with the MILF pushes through, which is why there is a need for a comprehensive security strategy even before any peace deal. “If a peace deal is struck, Mindanao would still be in the same boat as the rest of the Philippines,” observes Steven Rood, the Asia Foundation’s top man in Manila.
[77]

If the negotiations are unaccompanied by real change and Mindanao reverts to the status quo as what happened after the 1996 peace deal with the MNLF, the rebellion will surely resume in one form or another.
[78]

For the Philippines, the Moro struggle for self-determination while seemingly separate and distinct from the formation of Filipino nationhood is paradoxically the key to justice and a more equitable society in the Philippines as one Filipino-American intellectual put it, to wit:

The issue of Moro self-determination remains the key, the Archimedean point, to the prospect of security, civil liberty, progress, and above all justice, throughout the Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

Because the Moro struggle for independence and dignity is the key, virtually the catalyst and crucible, for the all-encompassing Filipino struggle for democracy, justice and national liberation, it is necessary to affirm once more the right of the Moro people to national self-determination. What is involved here is essentially the practice of political democracy by the masses, principally the underprivileged workers and peasants, but also the middle strata of professionals and even including the relatively wealthy business/merchants and small landlords (the datus and their clans). Neither differences in language, religion, nor territory can limit this democratic right of any national collectivity to determine its life and destiny, particularly against a colonizing and occupying power.
[79]


Political-economy of security

This brings us to the next question in U.S. counterterrorism strategy. If the U.S. has been perceived as lacking commitment in “state-(re)building” in situations of localized state failure such as in Mindanao, are there other countries more willing to engage in its intricacies that could complement U.S. efforts at the same time?

A viable U.S. counterterrorism strategy must move beyond police, intelligence and military assistance to help countries tackle the socio-economic vulnerabilities that provide openings for jihadists to exploit.
[80]

One country now increasingly involved in the Mindanao peace process is Japan, which in late 2006 joined the Malaysian-led International Monitoring Team that is monitoring the ceasefire between the Philippine government and the MILF. Japan as the country with the second largest economy in the world is a close political and military ally of the U.S. However, its pacifist constitution does not allow it to project its foreign policy by military means. Hence, Japan is one of the strongest practitioners of the “political economy of security.”
[81]

Japan has articulated conceptions of comprehensive and human security that stress the interrelationship between economics and security and has long-favored state-building policies as key to East Asian stability.
[82] For Japan, the root causes of domestic and transnational terrorism lie in the economic dislocation, societal alienation, human insecurity, and the failure of state apparatuses to provide for the security of their citizens; consequently, Japan has contended the logical response to terrorism is the application of economic power.[83]

It would seem that Ott’s thesis on some of the roots of terrorism is similar to the views of Japan’s policy elites. This political economy approach to security has somewhat complemented that of the U.S. agenda in the ‘war on terror’ by supporting key allies, but it has also shown signs of divergence because of Japan’s long-term commitment to state-building and human security.
[84]

In the case of Mindanao, aside from joining the IMT, Japan has committed a $400 million ‘Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao’ in December 2002. It also directly provided Bangsa Moro communities small infrastructure projects under its Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project through a special facility called the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development or J-BIRD in early 2007. Also under the J-BIRD it committed starting 2007 to conduct an Urgent Development Study for Socio-Economic Rehabilitation and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao with the cooperation of the MILF development arm created under the peace process, the Bangsamoro Development Agency. The support package for Mindanao priority areas are support for policy formulation and implementation of ARMM, support for improvement of basic human needs and support which directly contributes to peace-building and the fight against terrorism.
[85]


Nevertheless, it is not farfetched to see the U.S. having the same comprehensive security policy in conjunction with Japan in Southeast Asia, and it can very well start the formulation of that comprehensive security strategy in Mindanao. The U.S. and Japan as the main allies and economic supporters of the Philippines can help the Philippines extricate itself from the quagmire that is the Mindanao conflict (which is creating sanctuaries of terror in the region) through this comprehensive security strategy that would address the Bangsa Moro’s legitimate grievances against the central government as well.

Perhaps this is already beginning to be the case in Mindanao because the USAID is set to increase its flagship Growth with Equity in Mindanao program up to $145 million for the next five years starting in mid-2007 with the optional additional assistance in case of a peace agreement with the MILF is realized.
[86] According to the recommendation of Professor Marvin C. Ott, beyond counterterrorism assistance, the U.S. can assist countries in the region by doing two things: 1) finding multiple ways to convey respect for Islam and Islamic institutions, including enhanced contacts between Americans and Muslims in the region and 2) building political/diplomatic ties with the region.

The best way to convey respect to the Muslims in Mindanao is if they see that the programs and projects that are being implemented in their communities are done by fellow Bangsa Moro and not by Christian Filipinos.

Enter the Dragon

The U.S. working with Japan through the Mindanao peace process can also counter increasing Chinese influence in the Philippines. This influence is highlighted by the statement of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo at the East Asian Summit in January 2007 that: “We are happy to have China as our big brother.”
[87] Recently in March 2007, the National Economic Development Authority announced the approval of Official Development Assistance coming from China of almost $1 billion for new projects in telecoms and internet connectivity.[88] This latest assistance is on top of the pledges during the visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to the Philippines on April 2005 where China agreed to invest in the country $1.1 billion including $950 million in a nickel mine in economically-depressed Mindanao (although the mine deal has reportedly been put off).[89] It extended a concessional loan for the upgrade of the North Luzon Railway to the tune of $543 million as well as gave $2.5 million in grants.[90] Trade is increasing between the two countries with a surplus in favor of the Philippines so that China is now the fourth largest trading partner of the Philippines.

In a recent issue, Newsweek reported Henry Yep, of the U.S. National Defense University, saying China's assistance to key Asian countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines now far outstrips U.S. largesse, while a top Philippine defense official says that his "government is able to consider the types of relations it never would have before ... because China's public image is strong." (It's probably no coincidence that Manila recently accepted more than $400 million in Chinese aid.).
[91]

The U.S. and Japan cannot be expected to compete with the wave of money that will be coming from Chinese investments especially since economics is power and the balance of influence has begun to shift to China with the added dimension of the presence of a large and economically potent ethnic Chinese population, who currently dominate large sectors of the economy, particularly banking.
[92]

So it is only in the security dimension that they can gain leverage. However, the present stalemate between the MILF and the Philippine military presents them the opportunity to hedge their bets with the Bangsa Moro. This can be done by establishing a pro-Western Muslim body polity in Southeast Asia through the re-territorialization of a Bangsa Moro homeland within the Philippine state. The re-territorialization of a Bangsa Moro homeland can be done by means of supporting the peace process between the Philippine government and the MILF in the name of Human Security for the Bangsa Moro.

Clearly with the increased international attention, the current framework of the peace negotiations in the Mindanao conflict has gone beyond the traditional low-level mediation of the Organization of Islamic Conference and has now reached the level of International Diplomacy and application of International Law Framework since as explained below in one article on Human Security:

The international political architecture of the Cold War was defined by the respect for territorial integrity together with the principles of sovereign competence and noninterference. The architecture of the post-Cold War period has changed, however, especially in relation to ineffective states. While respect for territorial integrity remains, with regard to non-interference, sovereignty over the noninsured populations living within such states has become internationalized, negotiable and conditional. Interventions in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, have not challenged the territorial integrity of the states concerned; indeed, its principle has been upheld. What is in question is how populations within such territories are governed and maintained. Re-territorialization within the existing borders of ineffective states, based upon external oversight and control of core budgetary and human security functions, is not only seen as good in itself, it has been cast as essential for the security of mass consumer society.
[93]


Promoting Bangsa Moro Human Security, which is defined as a people-centered approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives, will in turn address the felt need for a comprehensive Moro policy on the part of the U.S. the lack of which was lamented in the following manner by Ralston Hayden as long ago as 1928: “The most urgent need is for the establishment by the United States of a stable Moro policy, one which will be recognized as permanent by interested Americans, and by Filipinos and Moros.”
[94] The key word in his statement is “Moro” because while America might have a generalized Philippine policy it does not currently have a Moro policy.
Bangsa Moro as cornerstone of new security architecture
The near collapse of Indonesia during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and the democratic upheaval that followed President Suharto’s overthrow created, in a strategic sense, a void where a cornerstone had once been.
[95] This event has changed the balance of power in Southeast Asia more particularly in its maritime zone in favor of China, which considers Southeast Asia as the “soft underbelly of Asia.”[96]
Hence, following the wake of Indonesian weakness in the age of globalization, we must look beyond the current nation-states for a security architecture that fits the way the world actually works. Otherwise, more nimble international terrorist networks will often be ahead of those who would try to stop them. A case in point is the rediscovery by JI of the ancient maritime byways and highways of maritime Islamic societies within East Maritime Southeast Asia that is used to traverse and cross borders in Maluku, Sulawesi, Mindanao and Borneo. In crossing these imposed colonial borders terrorist networks are not only traversing ancient trade routes but are actually crossing the boundaries of time to an age when Buginese, Ilanun, Ternatans, Magindanaw, Makassar, Brunei and Suluk (Tausug or Sama) roamed East Maritime Southeast Asia as the “Lords of the Sea.”
In fact, one report indicated that “JI operatives have reportedly recently landed in Poso from former sanctuaries in the southern Philippines, where they were once welcomed by the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation Front, but have more recently been flushed out by US-backed counter-terrorism sweeps by the Philippine armed forces. Indonesian authorities have encountered heavily armed fighters during their recent Poso operations and claim to have uncovered large weapons caches during raids, which they contend originated from the southern Philippines.”
[97]

The East Maritime Southeast Asia, which has been described by Japanese anthropologist Shinzo Hayase in his seminal book, Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations, Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia, had for its principal cornerstones or centers of power from the 16th to 19th centuries the Islamic sultanates of Brunei, Sulu, Ternate-Tidore, Makassar and Maguindanao.
[98]

Except for Brunei, the other sultanates had been subsumed by the modern states of the Philippines and Indonesia. Ternate and Tidore are in Maluku while Sulu and Maguindanao are in Mindanao. Coincidentally or not, these areas are also the hotbed of alleged terrorist activities including Christian-Muslim communal violence in the Maluku Islands after the fall of Suharto’s regime in Indonesia.
[99]


Two of the centers of power of that ancient East Maritime Southeast Asian Islamic society, the Maguindanao and Sulu sultanates, had suzerainty over much of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan. The re-territorialization of these areas into a Bangsa Moro homeland (at least the Moro-majority areas) will establish stability in the East Maritime Southeast Asia. Stability is crucial because the Bangsa Moro homeland is astride important Sea Lines of Communication (the Lombok-Makassar-Sibutu Straits) and is located at the Crossroads or Tri-boundary of East Maritime Southeast Asia consisting of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Anthropologist James Francis Warren has written extensively about the “Sulu Zone”, the borderless zone centered on maritime trade in the Sulu and Celebes seas between late 18th and 19th centuries, where three water-borne routes led into the heart of the Sulu zone. The Chinese began with the Sulu Sea, an extension southward from their trade entrepots in the Philippines, but they also navigated across the South China Sea through the Palawan passage, while Bugis mariners sailed north through the Celebes Sea into the zone.
[100]

In this context, if one ignores traditional political boundaries and views these seas as unifying rather than divisive agents – ‘great connectors’ strategically extending the region’s key shipping routes, a strong case could be made for regarding the zone as one of the final, albeit critically important, extremities of the world capitalist economy in eastern Asia.
[101]

The map of the Southern Philippines will show you “Sulu’s strategic gateway proximity to Indonesia, Malaysia, and control of South [East] Asia.”
[102] Professor Julkipli Wadi of the University of the Philippines says that, “The fact remains that the U.S. is grabbing every opportunity to stay long in Sulu. Whether for oil or to maintain security installations in Southeast Asia, the Sulu territory proves to be of strategic importance to the U.S.”[103]

What is less known is that East Maritime Southeast Asia and the Sulu Zone are actually one and the Sulu sultanate’s rise to prominence in the late 18th and 19th centuries was in succession to the decline of the Maguindanao sultanate. Hayase writes:

The Maguindanao sultanate was situated in the periphery of established “port polity” and expanded into Maritime Southeast Asia. It accepted the Islamic faith and was integrated into the international trade network. After the sixteenth century, Maritime Southeast Asia that was centered on “port polity” had been encroached upon and divided by the advancement of the European powers. In this reorganization of the area, Maguindanao escaped being colonized as it was situated in the buffer zone. While continuing to cooperate with other Maritime Southeast Asia areas, Maguindanao maintained and strengthened its identity. It developed into the strongest sultanate in East Maritime Southeast Asia for a certain period in the latter part of the eighteenth century. However, it did not last long.
[104] (Italics mine).

In fact, the Spanish imperial interest in Maguindanao, which never succeeded because of Moro resistance, was to develop Maguindanao as its future base in relation to the Maluku Islands.
[105] This was not farfetched considering that the Maguindanao Sultanate had a fleet of 1,000 sailing boats and continued to build boats in Northwest Sulawesi constituting itself into a strong naval power that could easily have occupied the entire Maluku Islands.[106]

Historically, Sulu focused on its relationship with Makassar and Brunei while Maguindanao had an alliance with Ternate effectively dividing their spheres of influence into the other sultanates in the East Maritime Southeast Asia.
[107] While Sabah in what is now East Malaysia was at one time or another under either the Brunei or Sulu sultanates.

Maguindanao had always been the galvanizing force in East Maritime Southeast Asia, with the example of Sultan Kudarat calling on the other sultanates for a “jihad” against the Spanish in 1656,
[108] and in order to fight the Dutch who ruled Ternate, they united with Datu Niku of Tidore and the British, reaching as far as New Guinea in their activities all over Maritime Southeast Asia.[109]

Hence, it is highly fortuitous that the MILF is now ascendant and currently the vanguard of the Bangsa Moro cause since it is Maguindanao-led and the Maguindanao are used to balancing their interests as against other ethnic groups’ interest constituting a multi-ethnic polity unlike the Tausug-led MNLF, who tend to dominate the other ethnic groups under their polity in the Sulu archipelago such as the Yakan, Sama and Bajau.

The former territories of the Sulu and Maguindanao sultanates are now the subject of the “ancestral domain” claim of the MILF in the peace talks. It is not feasible to divide these two centers of power because having one Bangsa Moro homeland combining the two actually means there is a stronger positioning (or anchor) over East Maritime Southeast Asia for stability of the region. Such strategic geographical setting and positioning is similar to the geographical setting and positioning of Iraqi Kurdistan at the heart of the boundaries of Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq, or that of Kosovo in the heart of the Balkan Peninsula, where there is a meeting of Turkic Islam, Orthodox Christianity and the West, or that of Afghanistan at the crossroads of Central Asia and South Asia, or simply that of:

Ciudad del Este, a Paraguayan city of 300,000 at the 'Triple Frontier' with Brazil and Argentina, and thanks to this helpful position a major rendezvous for smugglers of all types... [especially drug money]. What makes towns like Ciudad del Este attractive for the [illicit] business is that regulations are weak, governments are passive, and law enforcement is irrelevant or on the take. These laundering havens must also possess some modicum of a financial and telecommunications infrastructure. Where there are no banks, no ties to the global market, money laundering prospects dwindle severely. The ties that link these often remote locations to the rest of the world need not be varied or complex. In fact, many of these places are quite primitive and isolated and have only weak linkages with the outside world - except that banks and companies from around the globe claim them as their legal domicile. In this sense, Ciudad del Este for example is not that different from Transdniester near the Black Sea or Afghanistan's Badakshan province. They provide either a service (illicit financial services), a product (weapons), or a commodity (poppies) that the rest of the world wants in spades.
[110]

Several cities in the Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao (CAAM) might fit the description of Ciudad del Este like Marawi, Iligan, Isabela, Cotabato or Zamboanga. It is no wonder that similar to Ciudad del Este or the "Triple Frontier", Zamboanga and Cotabato in the CAAM has a U.S. military presence.
[111] It is also worthwhile to note that Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo are both semi-independent states and that they were given such status by the international community because of their strategic importance.


Stable Bangsa Moro homeland key to preventing Great Power War?

But perhaps our greatest concern should be that the terrorist outbreak in the area might herald a Great Power War, maybe between the U.S. and China, or between Regional Powers, Indonesia and Australia, with the Bangsa Moro areas acting as the flashpoint or trigger through terrorist activity in the area. This is according to the World System theory of Albert Bergensen and Omar Lizardo of the University of Arizona, which they presented in their paper International Terrorism and the World System, to wit:

Canary in the Mineshaft

Hegemonic decline destabilizes the global order, and outbreaks of international terrorism seem to serve as an indicator of growing international instability. Private violence by groups against states seems to precede state-to-state violence as perhaps a sign of the great unraveling the world-system periodically undergoes. Like the miner’s canary warning of leaking gas, so international terrorism signals the coming of Great Power war.
[112]


With the emergence of China as a world power and U.S. hegemonic power and influence in decline even in its traditional sphere of influence in the Philippines, the danger that Great Power War might be triggered by something happening in Mindanao exists because according to the World System theory the instability starts in Semi-Peripheral Zones and not the underdeveloped periphery or the developed core but more from this “middle zone”, which is precisely where Mindanao is at this stage, to wit:

Instability Starts in Semiperipheral Zones - Given that international terrorism breaks out in semiperipheral autocratic zones (HRE, Russian, Ottoman, and Austrian Empires; Arab-Islamic states), this suggests that the great unraveling that eventuates in the Great Power war begins in adjacent areas to the main contending states. Whether as Great Power rivalries (colonial competition, interventionism, and so forth) that generate backlash/blowback terrorism against empires and hegemonic centers; or as a weakening of hegemonic authority that empowers resistance to local autocratic rulers; or as a decline in support from the hegemonic center to dependencies in the semiperiphery that then encourages resistance in the form of terrorist attacks, it is the case that with hegemonic decline, terrorism tends to break out in the world-system’s more semiperipheral zones. That is, international terrorism does not so much arise from the underdeveloped periphery or from the developed and powerful core as it does from this more middle zone.
[113]

Following the World System theory, the violence in the semiperiphery, such as in Mindanao, and the succeeding violence amongst core states are not unrelated, for terrorist events have constituted the triggers for the previous hegemonic succession wars so that it was the revolting Protestant Bohemians throwing the Catholic Holy Roman Empire’s two ambassadors out of a second-floor window that triggered the Thirty Years’ War, and it was the assassination of the Austrian Archduke that triggered World War I.
[114]


What is to be done in the meantime to prevent terrorist trigger events in Mindanao? Perhaps it is time to practice the political economy of security strategy of Japan. While joint maritime patrols in the Greater Sulu-Sulawesi Seas corridor are now supposed to be conducted by the littoral states of Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia and the Philippines to interdict terrorist passage, it runs the risk of driving the informal trading networks in these seas deeper underground. The current cross-border “barter trade” is conducted in a semi-legal shadowland, tolerated within limits by Indonesian and Malaysian authorities, but suppressed as “smuggling” by the Philippines.
[115]

Accordingly, “the sub-region’s extensive littoral conspires with weak state capacity to ensure that suppression only drives trade underground [and] this illicit traffic provides a dangerous vehicle for trans-boundary movement by regional jihadist, posing a security threat to the entire region.”
[116] Following the political-economy of security approach in combating trans-boundary terrorism:

Bringing barter traffic back inside the legal system can introduce new friction into trans-boundary movement by terrorists – by linking free trade incentives to a comprehensive vessel registration program. This will simultaneously liberate thousands of small entrepreneurs from trade apartheid, capitalize the poor, weaken their dependency on extralegal institutions, and improve attitudes to state authority. As well as enhancing regional security, state capacity and the overall business climate in the longer term, free trade incentives could impart new impetus to the Mindanao peace process, currently at an impasse. Without a successful peace agreement, state failure in the Southern Philippines will continue to undermine prospects for security and growth throughout the sub-region.
[117]

One way of legalizing the underground trading network, which would allow for intelligence fusion against trans-boundary jihadists while at the same time addressing the socio-economic grievances of Moros, is to create a string of Free Ports in the Bangsa Moro areas or establish the future Bangsa Moro homeland as a Free Trade Zone as suggested by one magazine article.
[118] The earlier experience of the Americans in administering the Moro Province showed that because of open and free trade through so-called “Moro Exchanges” and shipping connections with Borneo, Singapore and even Australia it became “completely dependent upon its own revenues”, so that from the perspective of revenue generation, which is conceded as a major feature of state-building, the Moro Province could have remained autonomous or semi-independent.[119] Even earlier, Hayase traced that the major reason that the sultans’ power declined was because their overseas activities, which were the basis of their political and economic power were suppressed by the European colonialists using steamboats and unequal treaties.[120]

For the U.S. the lesson as one former White House official under the first President Bush, C. Boyden Gray, explained is that the U.S. should emulate the Venetian empire wherein he noted that "Whenever Venice won a naval battle, it asked not for territory, taxes or tribute but free-trade zones," and "As part of its commercial empire, Venice had to rely on extensive intelligence in order to avoid foreign troop basing. As a result, its intelligence service was unmatched and its diplomacy unrivaled."
[121] For more than a millennium, Venice was the shining triumph of the practice of the political-economy of security.

Ending Note

Nations rise and fall in the march of history. But the survival of a people as a distinct society is victory in itself. The Bangsa Moro in all their complexity of 13 ethno-linguistic groups has managed to survive the transition from an age when they were the “Lords of the Sea” and their decline to their current emerging status in the world stage.

Perhaps, as part of a wider security agenda in the Southeast Asian region it is now time to fulfill the desire of the Bangsa Moro people, which according to prominent Moro public intellectual Michael Mastura “is to be left free and sovereign having their own honored place in the community of nations…Their national aspiration is nothing more than to enjoy again the prerogative of chartering their own destiny with justice for all and to see the democratization of the wealth of their homeland.”
[122]



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Mastura, M., Muslim Filipino Experience: A collection of essays, OCIA Pub., Manila, 1984.

Martin, E., “Current Issues Briefing: Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?”, February 8, 2005 at
http://www.usip.org/philippines/reports/mindanao_martin.html

“MILF: 2007 make or break for peace talks”, Luwaran.com, January 1, 2007.

“MILF praises Bush for new commitment to peace process”, Luwaran.com, December 10, 2006.

Niksch, L., Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 4, 2007.

Naim, M. Illicit, How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, Random House, New York, 2005.

Ott, M., “Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?”, Strategic Forum No. 222, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2006.

Philippine Human Development Report 2005, UNDP.

Rogers, S. “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, Lessons of Failure in the Philippines”, 83 Foreign Affairs 18, 2004.

Rushford, G., “The Morass in Mindanao”, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 2006.

Santos, S., Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, Working Paper No. 3, East-West Center Washington, January 2005.

San Juan, E., “Ethnic Identity and Popular Sovereignty: Notes on the Moro Struggle in the Philippines”, Ethnicities; 2006; 3; 391, p. 413 at
http://etn.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/3/391

“Security Cooperation and Governance in Southeast Asia: Responding to Terrorism, Insurgency and Separatist Violence in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines”, Report of a Conference organized by IDSS and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 26-28, 2006.

Shultz, R. and Dew, A., Insurgents, terrorists, and militias: the warriors of contemporary combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006.

“Smile Diplomacy, Working magic along China’s periphery”, The Economist, March 31 – April 6, 2007.

Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 80, Singapore/Brussels, July 13, 2004.

Stofft, Gen. W. and Guertner, G., Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future, U.S. Army War College, March 14, 1994.

Storey, I., “China and the Philippines: Moving Beyond the South China Sea Dispute”, China Brief, a journal of analysis and information, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., Vol. VI, Issue 17, August 16, 2006.
Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/pv0212/mindanao.html

Tan, A., Southeast Asia as the Second Front in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating Threat and Responses, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.15, No.2 (Summer 2003).

Taylor, V., “Ups and down in Sulu peace work”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 3, 2006.

“USAID to pour $145-M into Mindanao in next 5 years” March 20, 2007 at
www.mindanews.com

Vatikiotis, M., “Brain not Brawn the key to winning the War on Terror”, April 4, 2007 at
http://www.opinionasia.org/BrainnotBrawn

Warren, J., The Global Economy and the Sulu Zone, Connections, Commodities and Culture, New Day Publishers, 2000.

Wolters, W. “Muslim rebel movements in the southern Philippines: recruitment area for al-Qaeda terrorists?”, Focaal –European Journal of Anthropology, No. 40, 2002.

* The author is the Regional Cabinet Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao since 2002. He has a Master of Laws in Petroleum Law and Policy from the Centre for Energy, Petroleum & Mineral Law & Policy of the University of Dundee, U.K. This paper was written on April 10, 2007 as background material for bidders for the Growth with Equity in Mindanao Program 3 of USAID, who interviewed the author in Cotabato City as resource person. For comments he may be reached at ishakmastura@hotmail.com

[1] Hayden, R., “What next for the Moro?”, 6 Foreign Affairs 637, 1927-1928.

[2] Mastura, I., “The State of Moro Self-Determination”, lecture at United States Institute of Peace, November 17, 2006 at http://www.usip.org/events/2006/mastura_talking_points.pdf

[3] Long, J., “The Pentagon’s Strategy Towards Southeast Asia: The Disconnected States”, IDSS Commentaries, Singapore, March 16, 2005 at http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=PublishingHouse&fileid=F6735C40-B709-CC59-F040-FE99414CCF42&lng=en

[4] Barnett, T., “The Pentagon’s New Map”, Esquire, March 2003 at http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/published/pentagonsnewmap.htm

[5] Supra note 3.

[6] Lindborg, J., presentation at “Security Cooperation and Governance in Southeast Asia: Responding to Terrorism, Insurgency and Separatist Violence in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines”, Report of a Conference organized by IDSS and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 26-28, 2006.

[7] Feickert, A., U. S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, February 4, 2005.

[8] Kaplan, R., Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond, Random House, New York, 2006.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Mastura, M., Muslim Filipino Experience: A collection of essays, OCIA Pub., Manila, 1984, p. 71.

[11] Kramer, P., The Blood of Government, Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines, Ateneo de Manila Press, Manila, 2006, p. 341.

[12] Abinales, P., Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Manila, 2004, p. 54.
[13] Martin, E., “Current Issues Briefing: Crunchtime for the Mindanao Peace Process?”, February 8, 2005 at http://www.usip.org/philippines/reports/mindanao_martin.html

[14] Philippine Human Development Report 2005, UNDP, p. 65.

[15] De La Costa, H., The Jesuits in the Philippines 1581-1768, Harvard University, Cambridge, 1967, p. 541.

[16] Supra note 14.

[17] Supra note 7.

[18] Supra note 7.

[19] Lind, W., “Understanding Fourth Generation War”, January 15, 2004 at www.antiwar.com

[20] Wolters, W. “Muslim rebel movements in the southern Philippines: recruitment area for al-Qaeda terrorists?”, Focaal –European Journal of Anthropology, No. 40, 2002, p.159.

[21] Shultz, R. and Dew, A., Insurgents, terrorists, and militias: the warriors of contemporary combat, Columbia University Press, New York, 2006, p. 264.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Abuza, Z., Balik Terrorism, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2005, p. 38.

[24] “Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Threat and Response”, Report of an International Conference organized by IDSS and the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State, April 12-13, 2006.

[25] Copley, G., The Art of Victory, Strategies for Personal Success and Global Survival in a Changing World, Threshold Editions, New York, 2006, p. 107.

[26] Cook, M. and Collier, K., Mindanao A Gamble Worth Taking, Lowy Institute Paper 17, Lowy Institute for International Policy, New South Wales, Australia, 2006, p. 38.

[27] Supra note 21, p. 268.

[28] Abinales, P. & Amoroso, D., “The Withering of Philippine Democracy”, History Current, Sept. 2, 2006.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Rogers, S. “Beyond the Abu Sayyaf, Lessons of Failure in the Philippines”, 83 Foreign Affairs 18, 2004.

[32] Stofft, Gen. W. and Guertner, G., Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future, U.S. Army War College, March 14, 1994.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] “Security Cooperation and Governance in Southeast Asia: Responding to Terrorism, Insurgency and Separatist Violence in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines”, Report of a Conference organized by IDSS and the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, September 26-28, 2006.

[36] Cook, M. and Collier, K.., “The Philippines’ Sanctuaries of Terror”, The Korea Herald, May 5, 2006.

[37] Corrado, M., “The Programme of Rehabilitating Internally Displaced Persons and Communities in the Southern Philippines (GOP-UNDP-EC): The Role of the European Union in the Protection of Human Rights in Third Countries”, federalismi.it n. 10/2006.

[38] Supra note 36.

[39] Supra note 36.

[40] Vatikiotis, M., “Brain not Brawn the key to winning the War on Terror”, April 4, 2007 at http://www.opinionasia.org/BrainnotBrawn

[41] Prendergast, J. and Thomas-Jensen, C. “Blowing the Horn”, 86 Foreign Affairs 74, March/April 2007.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Korteweg, R. and Ehrhardt, D., Terrorist Black Holes, A study into terrorist sanctuaries and governmental weakness, Cligendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague, November 2005, p. 51.

[44] Kreuzer, P., Political Clans and Violence in the Philippines, PRIF Report No. 71, Frankfurt, 2005, p. II.

[45] Ibid.
.
[46] Gutierrez, E., “In the Battlefields of the Warlords” in Kristina Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (eds.), Rebels, Warlords and Ulama, A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in the Southern Philippines, Institute for Popular Democracy, Quezon City, 2000, p. 74.

[47] Davis, A., “Philippine security threatened by small arms proliferation”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, August 4, 2003 at http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir030804_1_n.shtml

[48] “Battling the Abu Sayyaf, batting for extra measures”, Interview with Armed Forces of the Philippines spokesman Gen. Edilberto Adan with INQ7.Net at
http://www.inq7.net/exclusive/2001/june/30/adan_30-1-1.htm

[49] Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 80, Singapore/Brussels, July 13, 2004, p. 26.

[50] Supra note 14, p. 80.

[51] Supra note 14, p. 80.

[52] Supra note 14, pp. 80-81.

[53] Abbas, M., “Is a Bangsa Moro State within a Federation the Solution?”, Ateneo Law Journal, Vol. 48 No. 2, September 2003, pp. 290-368.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid.

[56] The author learned about this development from Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric John last November 14, 2006 at a meeting in the U.S. State Department in Washington, D.C.

[57] Supra note 53.

[58] Supra note 26, p. 18.

[59] “MILF praises Bush for new commitment to peace process”, Luwaran.com, December 10, 2006.

[60] Bacani, B., “Building a Constituency for Resolving the Moro Ancestral Domain Question”, Autonomy and Peace Review, Vol. 2, Issue 2, April-June 2006, p. 58.

[61] “MILF: 2007 make or break for peace talks”, Luwaran.com, January 1, 2007.

[62] Taylor, V., “Ups and down in Sulu peace work”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, September 3, 2006.

[63] Santos, S., Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, Working Paper No. 3, East-West Center Washington, January 2005, p. 5.

[64] Bacani, B., “MNLF Loses the ARMM: A Setback for Peace?”, Autonomy and Peace Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, October-December 2005, p. 33.

[65] Ibid.

[66] With the entry of U.S. forces in the Bangsa Moro areas specifically in the Sulu Archipelago, we can expect the presence of U.S. oil companies there to grow. In fact, the first exploration wells drilled in the Sulu Sea Basin were made by UNOCAL (now Chevron). However, now that the U.S. super-major ExxonMobil has just farmed-in into one of the Malaysian-operated Service Contracts in the Sulu Sea Basin last December 2006; other U.S. oil companies will certainly take a second look at the acreage.

[67] Docena, H., “When Uncle Sam comes marching in”, Asia Times Online, February 25, 2006 at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/HB25Ae04.html

[68] Santos, S., Delays in the Peace Negotiations between the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: Causes and Prescriptions, Working Paper No. 3, East-West Center Washington, January 2005, p. 5.

[69] Supra note 26, p. 61.

[70] Supra note 28.

[71] San Juan, E., “Ethnic Identity and Popular Sovereignty: Notes on the Moro Struggle in the Philippines”, Ethnicities; 2006; 3; 391, p. 413 at http://etn.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/6/3/391

[72] Ott, M., “Southeast Asian Security Challenges: America’s Response?”, Strategic Forum No. 222, Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2006.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Rushford, G., “The Morass in Mindanao”, Far Eastern Economic Review, December 2006.

[75] Supra note 31, p. 20.

[76] Niksch, L., Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine-U.S. Anti-Terrorism Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 4, 2007.

[77] Supra note 74.

[78] Supra note 31.

[79] Supra note 71, pp. 405 and 411.

[80] Supra note 72.

[81] Hughes, C., A Multidimensional Approach to Security: The Case of Japan, Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International and Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, 2006, p. 3.

[82] Ibid, p. 4.

[83] Ibid, p. 13.

[84] Ibid, p. 17.

[85] Support Package for Peace and Stability in Mindanao at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/pv0212/mindanao.html

[86] “USAID to pour $145-M into Mindanao in next 5 years” March 20, 2007 at www.mindanews.com

[87] “Smile Diplomacy, Working magic along China’s periphery”, The Economist, March 31 – April 6, 2007.

[88] Dumlao, D., “Neda OKs projects worth P49B”, Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 31, 2007, page A4.

[89] Storey, I., “China and the Philippines: Moving Beyond the South China Sea Dispute”, China Brief, a journal of analysis and information, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C., Vol. VI, Issue 17, August 16, 2006, p. 7.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Kurlantzick, J., “Beijing’s Big Push”, Newsweek International, April 9, 2007.

[92] Supra note 72.

[93] Duffield, M., “Human Security: Development, Containment and Re-territorialization” Chatham House ISC/NSP Briefing Paper 05/02, The Globalization of Security, October 2005.

[94] Supra note 1, p. 643.

[95] Supra note 72.

[96] Supra note 72.

[97] Guerin, B., “New terrorism front opens in Indonesia”, Asia Times Online, March 14, 2007 at www.atimes.com

[98] Hayase, S., Mindanao Ethnohistory Beyond Nations, Maguindanao, Sangir, and Bagobo Societies in East Maritime Southeast Asia, Ateneo de Manila University Press, Manila, 2007, p. 18.

[99] Tan, A., Southeast Asia as the Second Front in the War Against Terrorism: Evaluating Threat and Responses, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.15, No.2 (Summer 2003), p. 123.

[100] Warren, J., The Global Economy and the Sulu Zone, Connections, Commodities and Culture, New Day Publishers, 2000, p. 4.

[101] Ibid.

[102] “From the editor’s desk”, Peacework, American Friends Service Committee, February 2002 at http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org/pwork/0202/020201.htm

[103] Dela Cruz, J., “U.S. Oil Interests Behind Bill on Sulu Sultanate”, Bulatlat.com, Vol. VI No. 20, June 25 – July 1, 2006 at http://www.bulatlat.com/news/6-20/6-20-oil.htm

[104] Supra note 98, p. 72.

[105] Supra note 98, p. 51.

[106] Supra note 98, p. 142.

[107] Laarhoven, R., The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century, Triumph of Moro Diplomacy, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1989, Ibid, pp. 37-38.

[108] Supra note 98, p. 56.

[109] Supra note 98, p. 142.

[110] Naim, M. Illicit, How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are Hijacking the Global Economy, Random House, New York, 2005, pp. 142-143

[111] Hearn, K., "US military presence in Paraguay irks neighbors", Christian Science Monitor, December 2, 2005 at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1202/p25s02-woam.html

[112] Bergensen, A. and Lizardo, O., “International Terrorism and the World System”, Sociological Theory 22:1, March 2004, p. 49.

[113] Ibid, p. 50.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Collier, K., “Islands of Prosperity: Synergising Free Trade, Border Security and Conflict Resolution in the Sulu Zone”, Report for the Workshop on Security for Economic Growth of AusAID East ASEAN Initiative, March 12-13, 2007.

[116] Ibid.

[117] Ibid.

[118] “Bangsamoro: Make It a Freeport Zone”, Newsbreak, November 13, 2006.

[119] Supra note 12, pp. 20-21.

[120] Supra note 91, p. 140.

[121] Ignatius, D., “From Venice, a Lesson on Empire”, Washington Post, September 20, 2006.

[122] Fianza, M., “Contesting Land and Identity in the Periphery: The Moro Indigenous People of Southern Philippines”, Working paper prepared for the 10th Biennial Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property, August 9-13, 2004, held at Oaxaca, Mexico, p. 18.