Calling Peace Mediators to Account III: Asking the Hard Questions

FROM THE PLAINS OF KUTAWATO
By: Atty. Zainudin S. Malang (LL.M., M.R.I, J.D.)

CALLING PEACE MEDIATORS TO ACCOUNT
(Part III – Asking the Hard Questions)

Within the Bangsamoro community, there is a widespread suspicion that the Indonesian government has been compromised as mediator both before and after the signing of the agreement. Whether or not this has anything to do with the fact that Indonesia itself was facing its own “separatist” problem in East Timor at about the same time that the MNLF-GRP negotiations were at its crucial stage can only be the subject of speculation. But I do recall that the Philippine government adopted a hands-off policy on East Timor even though the vast majority of Catholic Filipinos, not to mention the international community, sympathized with their Timorese brethren. I also recall senior members of the MNLF recount that Indonesia allegedly “twisted” the arm of Misuari into signing the agreement lest they will recommend to the OIC to withdraw its support and recognition of his organization.

Setting aside the question of whether a true revolutionary should allow himself to be manipulated in such a brazen manner, what business does a mediator have in coercing a party to agree to an agreement that is bound to fail? That agreement was supposed to address the Bangsamoro’s assertion of their right to self-determination but anyone who has taken the time to go over the ’96 agreement will notice two things: first, that the autonomous government it is supposed to establish would end up being economically and fiscally dependent on the national government; second, that the implementation of the agreement would be subject to constitutional processes and dependent on institutions created by the Philippine constitution - in other words, dependent on the Philippine government.

So, you end up with a peace agreement that instead of allowing the Bangsamoro to exercise their right to self-determination, allowed the Philippine government to exercise it for them. That is not the right to self-determination. That is the right to “their”-determination which, before the 1996 agreement, did not exist as a concept. I am sure political scientists and international law experts would forever be thankful for the introduction of this strange concept, at least for its comical value.

It is this kind of agreement that the Indonesian government asked the MNLF to swallow, and swallow the MNLF did - hook, line, and sinker. Is it any surprise then that its implementation was beset by all sorts of problems? Recall the verbal tussles between Misuari and the Senate and, after 2001, the resumption of actual fighting between MNLF and AFP forces. And for most of this time, the Indonesian and Libyan ambassadors were saying all is well and good with the peace agreement or at least silent about its problems.

I have always said that the Bangsamoro is grateful to the OIC for showing their concern to their brethren in Minsupala. But it cannot be denied that someone dropped the ball in mediating the Mindanao conflict. Whether this can be attributed to a couple of members or all the members of the Committee of the Eight - or even the entire OIC itself - should be the subject of a sincere self-examination on its part if it wants to give the Bangsamoro and the Philippines something to be truly grateful about. Otherwise, what will happen is what we often see when a basketball referee is perceived to be biased - riots.

For sure, there are valuable lessons that can and should be drawn from the failures of the ’96 agreement. This is particularly true since there is another attempt to resolve the conflict between the Bangsamoro and the Philippines, the ongoing negotiations with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Perhaps it is understandable why the MILF has been reluctant to sign a peace agreement. They don’t want to fall into the same trap.

As for the MNLF-GRP agreement, quo vadis? Is it still capable of being revived? Can it still provide a just and lasting solution to the conflict? Was it ever? Is the Misuari-led MNLF still capable of taking the cudgels for the Bangsamoro?

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During the open forum in that testimonial dinner in Mandarin Hotel, I could not help but notice that the moderator was doing his level best to prevent me from asking my question to the Indonesian envoy. My friends from the media and diplomatic missions also noticed it and some started ribbing me about it. Eventually, they urged me to just stand up, go to the microphone, and just introduce myself and pose my question. After I started to get tired from raising my hand, I did.

I, of course, personally know the moderator and this made the excuses he offered after the program all the more lame. He tried to explain that he failed to notice me raising my hand which I thought was ludicrous since he didn’t fail to notice people to my left and right, sitting in the same table as I. I can only assume that he had an idea about the question I would ask and not wanting to put the Indonesian envoy on the spot, tried his best to ignore me. Perhaps, in so doing, he didn’t realize that he was sacrificing articulations of their people’s serious problems for the sake of being polite to the envoy. Indeed, some in the audience began to head for the door after telling me they were getting bored with the “safe” questions and answers.

Precisely, the point of asking hard questions is to make people or institutions account for their roles in resolving the conflict, to put them on the spot if necessary. Further, it is one thing for others to sanitize the status of the peace process. At times, that is to be expected. But it is both tragic and ironic to see some Moros themselves do the same thing. Maybe some of us are living such comfortable lives in Metro Manila that we have forgotten the miserable plight of their people back home and no longer see the need to articulate nor confront it. Imagine a former Moro member of the Commission on Human Rights stifling a fellow Moro. That is not only ironic, it is pathetic.

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It seems that after the first part of this series came out, more indications about the troubled ’96 agreement came out. The scheduled tri-partite meeting in early February was again cancelled. And then there was that unfortunate incident in Sulu where government and military officials were “hosted” by MNLF men. Would anyone still have the gall to sanitize the troubled agreement, I wonder.

Calling Peace Mindanao Peace Mediators to Account II: The Mediator's Accountability

FROM THE PLAINS OF KUTAWATO
By: Atty. Zainudin S. Malang, (LL.M., M.R.I., J.D.)

CALLING PEACE MEDIATORS TO ACCOUNT
(Part II – The Mediator’s Accountability)

In the first part of this article, I said that the mediator has two roles: first, is to facilitate the protagonists coming to an agreement on how to resolve their conflict; and; second, making sure that each party lives up to their end of the agreement. Parties that have been at odds with each other and taken diametrically opposed positions, so much so that they are willing to kill and die for their respective “mandates”, cannot be expected to stop fighting without the intervention of a third party.

A mediator is required to cajole, urge, and prod the warring parties to settle their differences peacefully. Since each would have a different conception of how the conflict started – imagine an exchange between two siblings as to who started the fight where one would point to the other and say “Siya nauna eh” who will then retort “Hindi! Siya ang nauna” – the mediator is also expected to help the parties come to a common understanding of how it all began. Thereafter, it will help them draft an agreement addressing the roots of their dispute.

Even after a peace agreement is arrived at, the mediator’s job does not stop. This is when the mediator’s second role kicks in. Protagonists who have trained their guns against each other cannot be expected on their own to faithfully stick to their end of the bargain. The mutual suspicion, animosity, mutual recrimination, one-upmanship, etc. brought about by decades of fighting are psychological baggage that cannot be erased overnight. Hence, you need a neutral mediator to perform the oversight function of making sure that the protagonists live up to their commitments.

As for the necessity of being neutral, we only need to look at what normally happens during basketball games when a referee is perceived to be biased in favor of one of the teams. Usually, such games end up in a fracas, in a fight, in a riot. All of these are basic stuff for anyone who has taken a seminar on conflict resolution.

So, going back to my questions in the first part of this article: Why did the ’96 Peace Agreement fail? Under whose watch did it fail? Besides the signatories themselves, who dropped the ball in settling the Mindanao conflict?

As I have said earlier, the OIC has delegated the role of mediating the Mindanao conflict and facilitating the MNLF-GRP talks to the Committee of the Eight (erstwhile Six). Of the members of this committee, the one who has taken the lead is Indonesia. Libya is also a very influential member.

When the emissary from the OIC Secretary-General’s office visited Mindanao last year to see for himself how the implementation of the agreement was going along, he spoke before leaders of Mindanao’s civil society. During the open forum, I took the opportunity to ask him to assess the OIC’s 30-year involvement in helping resolve the conflict which has thus far led to more than 100,000 deaths and millions of refugees. Of course, an honest answer from him would have been an admission of the mediator’s failure given the dismal peace and development situation on the ground. But of course, he could not make that admission in public. It would have been too embarrassing. The poor fellow could only quizzically look at the members of the Committee of the Eight, particularly Indonesia, who were also present in the hope that maybe they can help him answer the question. Unfortunately, the Indonesian envoy could only look down on the floor. So the Sec-Gen’s emissary ended up spending 10 minutes discussing generalities about the conflict and how difficult it is to resolve. Reminders from others who took the microphone after me that he did not actually answer my question were to no avail.

A few months after the fact-finding visit of the OIC Sec-Gen’s emissary, I had another opportunity to ask the same question. This time it was an envoy from Indonesia, a key player in facilitating the agreement as I understand from the introduction given about him. He was here to attend a testimonial dinner organized by the Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy (PCID) and funded by Konrad Adenauer Foundation and United Nations Development Program. Again, there was an open forum and this time, after pointing out that while we have the luxury of holding the forum at the plush Mandarin Hotel in Makati, the people of the Bangsamoro are still wallowing in misery 10 years after the peace agreement, I asked him to assess Indonesia’s involvement as mediator. As I had expected, the answer was evasive.

(Part III next week - Asking the Hard Questions)

Calling Mindanao Peace Mediators To Account I: A Failed Peace Agreement

FROM THE PLAINS OF KUTAWATO
By: Atty. Zainudin S. Malang

CALLING PEACE MEDIATORS TO ACCOUNT
(Part I – A Failed Peace Agreement)

In a few weeks from now, early February, a tripartite meeting between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), and the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) will be held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in order to sort out the problems in the implementation of the 1996 peace agreement between the two. The fact that this meeting has to be held only highlights the problem the 1996 peace agreement encountered in its implementation.

At this point, to call the agreement successfully implemented, rather than describing it at the very least as having a problematic implementation would be the height of chutzpa. In 1996, people within and outside the autonomous region were expecting the agreement to herald in an era of peace and prosperity not seen in decades. Instead, ten years hence, the component provinces of the region are still the poorest among all of the Philippines’ provinces. Its regional government has the lowest of fiscal allocations of all regions. Its residents have the lowest infant mortality, life expectancy, educational attainment, etc. Moros outside the region are still subjected to all forms of discrimination both by public and private institutions.

On the security side, the region is also the most militarized. Large-scale fighting between the MNLF and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) still occur. Terrorist groups like the ASG still operate. And if that is not enough to convince anyone of the failure, the MNLF’s signatory to the peace agreement is under arrest. The tri-partite meeting itself had to be postponed several times and that in itself an indication of that failure. How can a meeting be held between the GRP and the MNLF when the latter’s signatory won’t be able to attend because he is being incarcerated by the former?

Thankfully, during ceremonies marking the 10th year of the agreement on September of last year, no one dared to refer to those ceremonies as anniversaries or celebrations, not even the government. People are not that blind or insensitive after all.

Thus, the most obvious question on everyone’s minds is why the failure? Under whose watch did it fail? Who dropped the ball in settling the Mindanao conflict?

Analysts of the Mindanao peace process have not been remiss in addressing these questions. There are those who point out the government’s lack of sincerity as well as fiscal support for the regional government. Some even point to the constitutional and democratic limitations faced by the government in implementing the agreement. On their peace partner’s side, others point to the MNLF’s inability to transform itself from a revolutionary organization into one that is more political and administrative. I also heard someone observe the MNLF’s exclusivism in running the affairs of the ARMM and seemed to have forgotten that it fought not for the sake of its members and officers but for the sake of the Bangsamoro.

Most of the existing analyses, however, only look at the responsibility of the GRP and the MNLF in the failure of the agreement. For sure, there is so much blame to go around for these two. However, few look at the responsibility of the mediator, the OIC or more particularly the Committee of the Eight. The MNLF-GRP Peace Process after all is a tripartite peace process - there are two main protagonists (GRP and MNLF) plus the supposedly neutral mediator (OIC).

For purposes of simplicity, one may say that a mediator has two roles. The first is to facilitate the parties’ coming to an agreement as to how they will settle their differences. Success in this aspect is evidenced by a peace agreement. Once that agreement is signed, the mediator’s second responsibility kicks in and that is to make sure that the signatories live up to their end of the agreement. What evidence shall we look for success in this regard? Peace, or lack of fighting, and steady even if slow progress on the development side. In short, everything that is not in the autonomous region now.

Given these two roles, how do we now assess the OIC’s performance? The answer is obvious so perhaps so we should just ask ourselves how did the OIC fail dismally? To answer this question, we may need to look at who in the OIC actually oversaw the GRP-MNLF peace process. In other words, under whose watch did the process fail? Who dropped the ball?

For the unfamiliar, the OIC had delegated to six (now eight) of its member countries the responsibility of mediating the resolution of the conflict, hence the name “Committee of the Eight”. During the crucial 10 year period after the signing of the ’96 agreement, this committee was chaired by Indonesia. Libya is an influential member of the committee simply because it brokered the much-earlier 1976 peace agreement.

Last year, the OIC sent a senior adviser to its Secretary-General to Mindanao on a fact-finding mission to find out what went wrong with the agreement. During several forums and meetings he held with civil society groups, he pointedly told his audience to be candid and frank with their views and to relay those views to him directly. I took that to mean that the Secretary-General’s office suspected the Committee of the Eight was sanitizing its previous reports to the OIC about the status of the agreement to the OIC by downplaying serious problems or disagreements over its implementation. I still recall a statement by the Libyan Ambassador a few years back to the effect that there are no such problems with the agreement. He said this even as widespread fighting broke out between the MNLF and AFP, on a scale not seen since the 1970s.

True enough, the subsequent report of the Office of the Secretary-General itself, as opposed to the Committee of the Eight, was blunt in its assessment. There was none of the sugar-coating of or silence over serious problems or the glowing praises for the implementation of the agreement that was typical of statements coming from the Libyan or Indonesian missions here in the Philippines. A quote from the Secretary-General’s report makes one wonder if the current conditions of Moros would exist if the problems in the implementation of the agreement were not that serious:

“Muslims in southern Philippines, whose population is estimated at 8 to 10 million, are still living under deteriorating political, economic, and social conditions, which are evident in the extreme backwardness and acute lack of educational and health services. These conditions are in fact due to the central government’s control of natural resources in the Muslim areas, in addition to the political marginalization of Muslims that is manifest in the absence of fair representation in government and judiciary posts. Moreover, military operations have continued, leading to the displacement of more and more Muslims from their villages and towns on top of the continued demographic reengineering that has encouraged the migration of non-Muslims to the south in order to turn the Muslims there into the minority.”

(Part II next week - The Mediator’s Accountability)